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Abstract 
Energy is an important material foundation for the development of national economy. China's energy consumption mainly 
depends on fossil fuel which may be used out. On the other hand, energy  consumption leads to a lot of environment problems. 
It’s very significant to keep the energy, environment, and economic harmony. So, the implementation of the policy on energy -
saving and emission-reduction is an imminent problem to solve. In this paper, we apply the game theory to analyze the optimal 
strategy between the government and the enterprises in the process of implementing energy -saving and emission-reduction 
action. Then we get a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution. Finally according to the relationship of parameters obtained, we 
provide available recommendations for the government to design institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past 50 years, China's modernization has  a rapid development. This development not only brings up a 
large boost of the national microeconomics, but also causes a rapid growth of China's energy consumption[1]. Since 
the 21st century, China’s modernization in the transition period has gone through more serious challenge, one of 
which is the gap between the energy production and consumption that becomes larger year by year (see Table 1). 
The imbalance between supply and demand of the Chinese energy is aggravated increasingly. 
On the other hand, in China coal accounts for a great part in total energy consumption absolutely. For example, in  
2007China’s coal consumption is 2.58 billion tons, accounting for 69.5% of the primary energy consumption. This 
energy consumption structure dominated by coal leads to a large quantities of pollutant emissions, which has 
seriously affected the environment. According to the data from the Global energy network in 2007, the annual CO2 
emission of America was 2.8 billion tons, which is the first of the world. And the second is China, 2.7 billion tons, 
which is the only country close to US in CO2 emissions
 [2]. 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-13952298058. 
E-mail address: longruyin@163.com. 
 
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
187 -  © 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V. 8 5220
doi:10.1016/j.proeps.2009.09.252
Procedia Earth 
and Planetary 
Science Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 1 (2009) 1641–1646
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
 Table 1. Balance difference between energy production and consumption during the period of eleventh five-year in China unit: 10000 ton 
standard coal 
Year Total energy production Total energy consumption Balance difference 
2001 137445 143199 -5754 
2002 143810 151797 -7987 
2003 163842 174990 -11148 
2004 187341 203227 -15886 
2005 206068 223319 -17251 
Note: column of “Balance difference”, if positive number, production>consumption, if not, production<consumption 
 
Energy and environment is an important material foundation of human society. So, we must adhere to the 
national policy of energy saving and environment protection while developing economy. In 2006, the binding 
targets are proposed in the " outline of the Fifteenth-Year Plan for the national economic and social development of 
PRC " [3] ,namely energy consumption of unit GDP decreased by about20% and major pollutants reduced by 10%. 
At present, we still face the severe situation to achieve this goal. Enterprises play an important part in the energy-
saving and emission-reduction. Under the guidance of the policy, enterprises have made positive efforts, but in a 
word, the work of energy-saving and emission-reduction is far from the results expected. Energy-saving and 
emission-reduction is the problem of the economics negative externality. Therefore we can’t not only rely on the 
market, but also need the government to solve them. In this paper, we will explore the regulation design problem on 
energy-saving and emission-reduction of the government from the view of game theory. 
2. Game analysis in energy-saving and emission-reduction of the government and enterprises  
Game is a process from which the individuals , teams or other organizations get results or benefits through 
selecting simultaneously or sequentially ,once or many times, among a group of available behaviours or strategy and 
implementing them ,based on definite situation and information on hand [4]. In energy-saving and emission-
reduction, the government plays the role of public persons, regulators, and arbiters, who pursuit social and 
environmental benefits. For enterprises, energy-saving and emission-reduction means saving energy and protecting 
environment, but if enterprises carry it out actually, it will result in higher production costs, lower profits in the short 
term. Energy-saving and emission-reduction is the problem of negative externality, if the absence of external 
constraints, the market mechanism can’t directly lead the enterprises pursuing max profit conduct energy-saving and 
emission-reduction. The individual rationality of enterprise pursuing max profit conflicts with the collective 
rationality of the government pursuing economic sustainable development, which will necessarily result in game in 
the process of the making and implementation of the policy. 
2.1. Inter-enterprise game before government regulation[5] 
Government regulation is the general rule or special act enforced by the independent government regulators of 
legal status in the market .Regulation is a set composed of control rules and enforcement measures of a series of the 
related organizations, state, ideology, interests and process [6]. Enterprise behaviour may be different from the 
government regulation or not. 
We start with the assumption that the society only call upon energy-saving and emission-reduction, the 
government doesn’t regulate enterprise behaviour practically. Next we will take the phenomenon that enterprises 
don’t implement energy-saving and emit pollutants illegally as an example to illustrate the game among enterprises. 
In order to study the problem conveniently, we assume there are only 2 enterprises separately called Enterprise1, 
Enterprise2 in the game. They all have bounded rationality. They compete in a particular field, producing the same 
the production with price P, sharing the same market, that is, 50% separately. 
If only Enterprise 1 doesn’t take action, Enterprise 1 can get additional revenue from the environment for a> 0; if 
only Enterprise 2 doesn’t take action, enterprise 2 can get revenue for b> 0; if neither enterprises take measures to 
achieve the purpose of energy-saving and emission-reduction at the same time, then Enterprise 1 benefits m, for a> 
m> 0, Enterprises 2 benefits n, for b> n> 0; if both enterprises take measures, both sides can benefit 0. The payoff 
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 matrix is shown as Figure 1. 
 
                                                                                   Enterprises 2 
 
Enterprises 1 
 Not action Action 
Not action (m,n) (a,0) 
Action (0,b) (0,0) 
Fig. 1. Payoff matrix of Enterprises 1 and Enterprises 2 
Thus in accordance with the "invisible hand" principle, if the government does not regulate the enterprises, 
Enterprise 1 and Enterprise 2 eventually  will choose not to take actions from the self-serving purpose, getting 
revenue m, n respectively. In other words, as long as the enterprises can get additional revenue greater than 0 for not 
taking actions to reduce pollutants, the enterprises finally will do nothing for the environment. 
2.2. The game between the government and enterprises after the government regulation[7] 
According to the role orientation of the local government and enterprises in the energy-saving and emission-
reduction, we make the following assumption: For the local government and the enterprises, they all pursuit max 
profit rationally; The sole criterion local government evaluates the enterprise on energy-saving and emission-
reduction only is decided by the standard reaching situation; The government may choose to impose fines on the 
enterprises that can’t reach the purpose of the energy-saving and emission-reduction, or encourage the enterprises for 
a good job of saving businesses and emission reduction, such as  reducing taxes or giving subsidies (J), but the local 
government have to pay out the inspecting cost (C) to obtain information for the policy implementation ;If the 
enterprises reach the targets, local governments will be rewarded (R) by the higher authorities, otherwise pay for that 
(E); Enterprises may invest the capital (I) to carry out technological transformation and introduce new equipment for 
energy-saving and emission-reduction, by this, they can  reach the target, then get the reward (J) from the 
government ,otherwise they choose not to complete the targets, be exposed, then imposed fines (F), the probability 
exposed is r, and the  enterprises’ behaviour may affect their social image and report  (H). The payoff matrix of both 
sides is shown as Figure 2. 
                                                                   Local government 
Enterprises 
 Inspect Not inspect 
Completion ( I J, C J+R ) ( I,  R ) 
Not completion ( rF H, C rF E ) (0, E ) 
Fig. 2. Payoff matrix of enterprises and the local government 
For the two sides of the game, each has two alternative strategies. That is to say, the enterprises can choose to 
complete the targets or not, meanwhile the government may also choose to inspect or not. If the enterprises have 
chosen to complete the targets, for RJCR <−−  , the government chooses not to inspect; if the enterprises 
choose not to complete the targets , and if CrF > , the government choose to inspect, if CrF < , the government 
choose not to inspect. If the government chooses to inspect and HrFJI −−>+− , the enterprises choose to 
complete the targets, if HrFJI −−<+− , the enterprises choose not to complete the targets; if the government 
chooses not to inspect, the enterprises choose not to complete the targets. The game process can be shown in the Fig 
3. 
From Fig 3, we can see the government and the enterprises have obtained two pure strategies Nash equilibriums: 
(not inspect, not complete) and (inspect, not complete), which are all not good for the energy-saving and emission-
reduction. Next we will analyze the mix strategy Nash equilibrium of two sides. 
We assume p to be the probability the government inspect, which depends on the enterprises’ information on the 
energy-saving and emission-reduction grasped by the government and the government’s own effectiveness; We 
assume q  to be the probability the enterprises complete the targets, which depends on the government’s inspecting 
capacity and the corresponding penalties and incentives. 
The expected return of the government can be expressed as follows: 
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The first order derivative of p : ∂ Govpi / p∂ = 0qJ qR C rF qrF qRE− + − + − + =                                          (1) 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1 1 1 0q p I J p I q p rF H ppi = − + + − − + − − − + −
Ent
                                                    (2) 
 
The first order derivative of q : ∂ Entpi / q∂ = 0pJ I prF pH− + + =                                          
 
The conclusion of the equation (1) and (2):   Ip
J r F H
∗ =
+ +
   r F C
q
r F J
−
∗ =
+
 
This is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium obtained from the game between the government and  the enterprises 
in the energy-saving and emission-reduction ,that is , the government choose to inspect by p ∗ , the enterprises 
choose to complete the targets by q ∗ . It shows that if the probability the government inspects is greater than  p ∗  , 
the enterprises’ optimal strategy is to implement the energy-saving and emission-reduction; conversely, the 
enterprises’ optimal strategy is not to complete the targets; if the probability the enterprises complete the targets is 
less than q ∗ , the government's optimal strategy is to inspect, on the contrary, the government choose not to inspect. 
 
Fig. 3. The game process between the enterprises and the government 
We can draw the conclusions from 
I
p
J r F H
∗ =
+ + , as follows: p ∗ is positively correlated with I , indicating 
that the greater probability  the government inspect, the more capital the enterprises will invest; p ∗  is negatively 
correlated with J, r, F , H, indicating  that the more the government reward the enterprises ,the stronger capacity the 
government inspect, the more fines the government impose on the enterprises and the more the government concern 
about the social image, the smaller probability the  government inspect. 
Seeing from
r F C
q
r F J
−
∗ =
+ , q ∗  is positively correlated with r  and F , indicating that the stronger capacity the 
government  inspect ,the more severe penalty ,the more  the enterprises are inclined to completing the targets; q ∗  is 
negatively correlated with C , J , indicating the greater cost the government inspects, the less probability the 
enterprises complete the targets and the government will give more incentives and concessions to the enterprises that 
complete the targets. 
3. Regulation design for the government in energy-saving and emission-reduction  
It can be seen from the above game analysis whether the government inspects and the enterprises complete the 
targets are subject to multiple factors. For the government, whether the enterprises complete the targets will be 
subject to the following factors:
• Implementing the energy-saving and emission-reduction in the short term will damage the enterprises’ profits, so 
only relying on the enterprises’ self-consciousness does not work. The government must regulate the enterprises’ 
behaviour on energy-saving and emission-reduction.  
•  q ∗  is positively correlated with r , negatively correlated with C , so the Government should improve its 
inspection capabilities and make efforts to reduce inspection costs, in this way the probability the enterprises 
complete the  targets will be larger.  
• p ∗  is negatively correlated with F and q ∗  is positively correlated with F , so if the government imposes  
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severe penalty on the enterprises , even if the government doesn’t inspect frequently , the enterprises will choose 
to complete the targets.  
•  p ∗  is negatively correlated with H , the more attention  the enterprises pay to the social reputation, the more 
actively they complete the targets. Thus the government needn’t inspect frequently. 
Now let’s start from these factors, and give some suggestions on the energy-saving and emission -reduction to 
help the government design institutions. 
3.1. Leading role and  supervision function of the government y 
The targets are put forward in the national "eleventh five-year" Plan that by 2010 the energy consumption of per 
ten thousand Yuan GDP decrease by 20% and the emission of major pollutants decease by 10%. The government 
must put the energy-saving and emission-reduction as an important handle regulating the economy, and play the 
leading role in energy-saving and emission-reduction. On April 1, 2008 the implementary newly revised "Energy 
Law" provides for more stringent energy-saving management measures. Now the reason that some enterprises who 
know the law break the law in the environment is not the softening of the law, but the deviations existed in the 
policies implementation of energy-saving and emission-reduction and not enough supervision [8]. We can know 
from the above game analysis, q ∗  is positive correlated with F . That is, the severer penalty the government 
imposes on the enterprises, the more actively the enterprises choose to complete the targets. It was reported in the 
"People's Daily" [9] , an enterprise in Guangdong needed 10 million cost for controlling the  pollutants to complete 
the targets, but if it broke the law ,the imposed fines wouldn’t exceed 0.5 million, so enterprises would rather  be 
punished than control the pollutants. As for enterprises, their instinct is to pursuit max profit, now that the cost of 
keeping the law is far higher than the cost of breaking the law, enterprises choose to offend the law naturally. The 
government should intensify law enforcement and punishment, and shall investigate the responsibilities of relative 
individuals and leaders. The empirical research has proved that in the long run, strict environmental management 
and pollution prevention will benefit macro-economic [10] . 
3.2. Implement and establishment of regulations o  
If the government want to improve the inspecting capability, it is imperative to set up the regulation of 
responsibility for work and accountability. Work targets and tasks of energy-saving and emission-reduction should 
be distributed to the cities, countries and important enterprises step by step based on scientific calculations, forming 
the work pattern of step-by-step responsibility. At the end of every year, the completion situation of energy-saving 
and emission-reduction will be reported and brought into the comprehensive evaluation regulation of the local 
economic and social development, as an important aspect to evaluate the performance of the government leader and 
enterprise legal persons. By implementing these measures, local governments and enterprises will fully realize the 
necessity and urgency of energy-saving and emission-reduction, correct the past view of development only focusing 
on GDP, and pay more attention to economic sustainable development and people’s vital interests. 
3.3. Foster public subject consciousness of energy-saving and emission-reduction, improve information feedback 
mechanism 
Energy-saving and emission-reduction is a project benefiting future generations, which involves every walk of life 
and requires the joint efforts, so everyone need participate in it actively under the government’s initiation and 
promotion. The strong or week awareness of energy-saving and emission-reduction, to a large extent can influence 
whether the energy-saving and emission-reduction carry on smoothly as well as influence its ongoing breadth and 
depth. Public not only need take the initiative to strengthen the self-management and reduce pollutant emissions, but 
also need form an interaction with the government, do well in supervising, pass the information that enterprises 
consume energy and discharge pollutants illegally, by this we can improve the government's efficiency, reduce the 
government's inspecting cost, and establish mechanisms that public participate in for protecting the environment [11]. 
3.4. Intensify the enterprises’ "reputation" awareness, set up public mechanisms for disclosing environmental 
information 
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 Reputation is the extent enterprises acquire public trusts and praises, as well as enterprises is good or bad in the 
public. It is a wide range of a comprehensive cognitive produced by the broad stakeholders over a period of time for 
the enterprises, including different degrees of trust and respect. If enterprises carry out energy-saving and emission-
reduction, they will get the "reputation" on energy conservation and environment protection, which will help 
enterprises win more loyal consumers, get the understanding and support from stakeholders, or even finance with 
lower the cost. The government can set up a public mechanism for disclosing environmental information. The 
mechanism requires enterprises to disclose their product information, pollutant emissions and environmental impact 
on time. Through this mechanism, under the pressure from public opinion, enterprises will put the social image as 
one of operational objectives, therefore increase the probability of complete the targets. 
4. Conclusions  
Good regulation plays a key role for energy-saving and emission-reduction, which is the key to standardize the 
behaviour of the government and enterprises. Enterprises are the main force to carry out energy-saving and 
emission-reduction, if enterprises’ enthusiasm increases, the effectiveness of energy-saving and emission-reduction 
will significantly increase. In this paper, we analyze the game between the government regulation and enterprises’ 
behaviours on energy-saving and emission-reduction, and on this basis we offer some proposal for the government 
to design institutions. What is scant, this paper doesn’t elaborate how the government uses these mechanisms to 
increase initiative on energy-saving and emission-reduction, remaining to be further studied. According to the 
article, the game between the government and enterprises on the issue will exist for a long time, and we hope 
institutions will be gradually improved and perfected in the course of repeated game. 
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